When Impunity and Corruption Embrace: How the Past Becomes the Future in the Struggle Against Torture and Genocide by Iglesias, Elizabeth M.
University of Miami Law School 
University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository 
Articles Faculty and Deans 
2018 
When Impunity and Corruption Embrace: How the Past Becomes 
the Future in the Struggle Against Torture and Genocide 
Elizabeth M. Iglesias 
University of Miami School of Law, iglesias@law.miami.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/fac_articles 
 Part of the Law and Society Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Elizabeth M. Iglesias, When Impunity and Corruption Embrace: How the Past Becomes the Future in the 
Struggle Against Torture and Genocide, 25 U.C. Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 1 (2018). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty and Deans at University of Miami School of 
Law Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of 
University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact 
library@law.miami.edu. 
WHEN IMPUNITY AND CORRUPTION EMBRACE: How THE PAST




In this article, Professor Elizabeth Iglesias takes up the challenge of
overcoming impunity for atrocity crimes as a problem of structural
corruption. Beginning with the 2013 trial and conviction of Guatemalan
leader Efrain Rios Montt for crimes against humanity and genocide in the
courts of his own country, the article turns to the scandal surrounding
United States' President Donald Trump's repeated threats to fire the special
counsel investigating allegations that he and his campaign colluded with
foreign nationals to steal the 2016 presidential election and the scandal
surrounding the nomination and confirmation of Gina Haspel as the first
woman to direct the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Understanding the
structural homologies that create the conditions of possibility for impunity
across these very different and seemingly unrelated contexts reveals the
critical importance of historical memory and legal theory in the struggle
against impunity. Whenever impunity takes hold, it is never just a matter of
simple quid pro quo corruption. On the contrary, impunity threatens the
rule of law and the stability of republican government precisely because it
both constitutes, and depends upon, a corruption of law and legal
institutions. Recognizing this kind of corruption requires historical memory.
Understanding it requires legal theory.
* Copyright 0 2018 Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Professor of Law, University of Miami School
of Law. Thanks to Professors Raquel Aldana and Steven Bender for organizing this important
conference, to all the conference participants, who made it such a significant event, and to the
editorial staff of the UC Davis Journal of International Law and Policy. Thanks also and
mostly to my wife, Professor Madeleine M. Plasencia, who knows all the reasons for my
thanks.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The LatCrit South-North Exchange convoked in Antigua, Guatemala on
May 18 & 19 of 2018 is my first return to Guatemala since 1989,' when I
came here as a researcher for the Center for Criminal Justice at Harvard Law
School.2 That was just three years after Guatemala transitioned from decades
of military dictatorship to the first civilian administration elected through a
formally democratic process since the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz's
government by a CIA backed military coup in 1954. Unfortunately, the
political opening that produced the 1986 electoral victory of Christian
Democrat, Vinicio Cerezo was four years too late to prevent the genocide
that absorbed so much the attention of so many at this LatCrit conference.
This was the genocide perpetrated against the Ixil Maya people of
Guatemala by the Guatemalan Army under the command of Efrain Rios
Montt. Like many of the heads of state who attained power during the years
of coups and countercoups that followed the CIA's covert operation against
Arbenz, Rios Montt seized power by military coup in 1982, and was ousted
by military coup in 1983. The 17 months of his rule as defacto head of state
were the bloodiest of a very bloody war, during which he presided over the
killing of 5.5% of the Ixil Maya.4
Historical memory is critical to achieving justice because justice is
always something that comes after the wrong has been done. If justice
comes, it is usually after corruption and impunity have failed to secure their
common ground in the destruction of memory. Whether social, institutional
I See LatCrit SNX (South-North Exchange) From Extraction to Emancipation:
Development Reimagined, Call for Papers, 2018 LATCRIT SNX (SOUTH-NORTH EXCHANGE
CONFERENCE) (2018), http://www.laterit.org/content/south-north-exchange/2018-south-north-
exchange/ (last visited Aug 18, 2018). This conference carries forward the important work of
Professors Aldana and Bender to promote human rights in Guatemala. See also Raquel E.
Aldana & Randall S. Abate, Banning Metal Mining in Guatemala, 40 VT. L. REv. 597, 597-
671 (2016); Steven W. Bender, Guatemala Labor as an Extractive Industry: Critiquing the
Precarity of the Maquiladora Export Model in the Neoliberal Era, in FROM EXTRACTION TO
EMANCTPATION: DEVELOPMENT RE1MAGINED (Raquel Aldana & Steven W. Bender eds.,
2018) (discussing the relative harms and benefits of foreign-owned apparel factories in
Guatemala).
2 Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Guatemala: Beyond Atrocity, LISALETNE PRODUCrIONS, LLC
(2014), http://lisaleine.com/guatemala-paintings/, (last visited Sept. 3, 2018).
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, Memorandum: CIA's Role in the Overthrow of
Arbenz, (May 12, 1975),
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroon/docs/DOC_0000919933.pdf; CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, Congress, the CIA, and Guatemala, (1954),
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-
csi/vol44no5/html/v44i5a03p.htm (last visited Aug 18, 2018).
4 Elisabeth Malkin, Former Leader of Guatemala is Guilty of Genocide Against Mayan
Group, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/1 /world/americas/gen-
efrain-rios-montt-of-guatemala-guilty-of-genocide.html.
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or living, memory must be destroyed for corruption to flourish and impunity
to prevail, and so corruption and impunity often are found entwined in a
mutual embrace. In the dissemination of disinformation which destroys
social memory, in the destruction of evidence which destroys institutional
memory, in the murder of witnesses which destroys living memory,
corruption and impunity combine so that justice may not be done. The trial
of Rios Montt in 2013 came thirty years after Tiburcio Utuy was tortured by
Guatemalan soldiers under Rios Montt's command.5 Thirty years may be but
the blink of a star in the lives of states or the course of human events, but
justice should be measured in time frames relevant to the lives in being at
the time of the wrong.6 Until Rios Montt's trial, prosecution for atrocity
crimes committed during the 36 years of violence was limited to low level
soldiers, police, paramilitary operatives and civil patrols.7  The first
conviction ever of a former head of state for genocide and crimes against
humanity in the courts of his own country was a moment made possible by
the institutional memory of orders documented and preserved and the living
memory of the more than 90 witnesses, who like Tiburcio recounted the
crimes they survived to remember.8 But the nature of a moment is to pass,
and this moment passed ten days later when Guatemala's Constitutional
Court annulled Rios Montt's conviction.9 The Court also re-opened the
5 Emi MacLean, Guatemala Faces Human Rights Complaint over Rios Montt Trial
Debacle, INT'L JUSTICE MONITOR, Nov. 8, 2013,
https://www.ijmonitor.org/2013/1 1/guatemala-faces-human-rights-complaint-over-rios-montt-
trial-debacle/.
6 James Painter, General Efrain Rios Montt: Former Guatemalan dictator who got away
with mass murder, THE INDEPENDENT, Apr. 2, 2018,
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/efrain-rios-montt-guatemala-dictator-
dead-died-age-genocide-mass-murder-a8284936.html.
7 Emi MacLean, Judging A Dictator: The Trial of Guatemala's Rios Montt, OPEN
SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, (2013),
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/judging-dicatator-trial-guatemala-
rios-montt-1 1072013.pdf.
8 Mary Jo McConahay, Guatemalan genocide survivors take stand at Rios Montt trial,
NATIONAL CATHOLIC REPORTER, Apr. 8, 2013,
https://www.ncronline.org/news/world/guatemalan-genocide-survivors-take-stand-r-os-montt-
trial (recounting how more than one witness has stated "a belief he or she survived in order to
testify 'before the law' for the sake of those who died."); see also Jo-Marie Burt, Rios Montt
Convicted of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity: The Sentence and Its Aftermath, INT'L
JUSTICE MONITOR, May 13, 2013, https://www.ijmonitor.org/2013/05/rios-montt-convicted-
of-genocide-and-crimes-against-
humanity-the-sentence-and-its-aftermath/ (noting that the court's finding of command
responsibility was based
on the testimony of military experts and documentary evidence of "regular reporting
requirements (every fifteen days) up the chain of command to the president, evidenced in the
annexes of one of the military operational plans entered into evidence in the case.").
9 Emi MacLean, Guatemala's Constitutional Court Overturns Rios Montt Conviction
and Sends Trial Back to April 19, INT'L JUSTICE MONITOR, May 21, 2013,
4 [Vol. 25:1
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question whether Montt's prosecution was precluded by the general amnesty
Mejia Victores had decreed in 1986.10
Mejia Victores, the golpista who overthrew Montt in 1983, had
purported by Decree Law 8-86 to grant permanent amnesty for all political
and related common crimes committed between March 1982 and January
1986. Ten days after Montt's conviction for genocide and crimes against
humanity, Guatemala's Constitutional Court re-opened the question of
amnesty, notwithstanding well-settled Guatemalan and international law
precluding impunit for grave violations of international humanitarian and
human rights law.' Known generally as atrocity crimes, this class of crimes
for which amnesty is prohibited are also subject to universal jurisdiction and
impose on states, by international convention or custom, an obligation to
prosecute or extradite persons accused of genocide, crimes against humanity,
torture, grave war crimes, and other gross human rights violations.'2 The
moment of justice passed because memory is only one of the elements that
justice requires to defeat the potent combination of corruption and
impunity.
I would like to address these issues of historical memory and the
struggle against impunity and corruption in a context different from Rios
Montt's trial for genocide and crimes against humanity, but perhaps not as
different as we would hope. The context that concerns me is my own
country and an assemblage of interconnected persons, actions and events
that in my opinion constitutes an abiding scandal of structural corruption and
engineered impunity. I am not talking about the corruption of a quid pro quo
https://www.ijmonitor.org/2013/05/constitutional-court-overtums-rios-montt-conviction-and-
sends-trial-back-to-april-19/.
0 Hayded Valey, Impunity Watch, Policy BriefAmnesty: National Reconciliation Law or
Decree Law 8-86?, (Nov. 2014) at 16,
https://www.impunitywatch.org/docs/Amnistiaversion i gles.pdf.
" Id.; see also MacLean, supra note 5 (noting that Decree 133-97, issued in December
1997, repealed all amnesty laws prior to 1996. The National Reconciliation Law, Decree 145-
96 provides a general amnesty for political crimes committed during the armed conflict and
related common crimes (Articles 2-7), but excludes from any amnesty international crimes
including genocide, torture and forced disappearance (Article 8)).
12 Mugambi Jouet, Spain's Expanded Universal Jurisdiction to Prosecute Human Rights
Abuses in Latin America, China, and Beyond, 35 GA. J. INT. COMP. LAw 495 (2007).
13 Jo-Marie Burt, Historic Verdict in Guatemala's Genocide Case Overturned by Forces
of Impunity, NACLA, June 17, 2013, https://nacla.org/news/2013/6/17/historic-verdict-
guatemala's-genocide-case-overtumed-forces-impunity-0 (recounting the media campaign of
paid advertisements "asserting that the genocide charges were fabricated, accusing the
different actors involved in the trial of being guerrillas or their stooges, and preaching doom
should Rios Montt be convicted;" calling the trial an "end of the peace accords" that would
open a new phase of violence;" issuing threats to "paralyze" the country and bomb threats at
government offices including the Constitutional Court; the judges involved were targeted with
media campaigns to discredit them and threatened with disciplinary, civil and criminal
charges, etc.).
2018] 5
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exchange of money for impunity although conflicts of interest are a key
element in the story I want to tell. A quid pro quo understanding of
corruption is much too facile because it fails to acknowledge that money is
not the only benefit that accrues from complicity with the interests of the
powerfully positioned and direct exchanges are not the only way impunity is
secured. Impunity for atrocity crimes is not just a matter of quid pro quo
corruption, nor is it a problem unique to Guatemala; wherever impunity
takes hold, it threatens the rule of law and the stability of free government
precisely because it constitutes and depends upon a corruption of law and of
legal institutions. To demonstrate these points, I call your attention to a
scandal that has been a constant preoccupation of mine since it first emerged
as a public spectacle. I am referring to the torture scandal, and what I mean
by this is the scandal that began in 2004 when photographs of American
soldiers torturing Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib were leaked to the press.
The scandal triggered a series of Congressional hearings and prosecutions of
very low level soldiers,14 but even now, 14 years later, none of the architects
and principals responsible for the policies that resulted in the torture of Iraqi
prisoners at Abu Ghraib have ever been prosecuted, let alone convicted for
their role in these atrocities.15
In the 14 years since the Abu Ghraib torture photos triggered the first
inquiry into a seemingly never-ending scandal, the public has been treated to
cycles of news eruptions as fallout from the scandal continues to unfold over
time.16 Various Congressional hearings to determine what had happened
generated the initial cycle of media attention when the photos first emerged
in 2004.17 This round of coverage quickly petered out as evidence
implicating officials further up the chain of command cooled interest in the
14 S. G. MESTROVIC, TRIALS OF ABU GHRAIB: AN EXPERT WITNEss ACCOUNT OF
SHAME AND HONOR (1 edition ed. 2006); CNN Library, Iraq Prison Abuse Scandal Fast
Facts, CNN, Mar. 18, 2018, 4:55 PM, https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/30/world/meast/iraq-
prison-abuse-scandal-fast-facts/index.html.
1s Karen J. Greenberg, Abu Ghraib: A Torture Story Without a Hero or an Ending, THE
NATION, Apr. 28, 2014, https://www.thenation.com/article/abu-ghraib-torture-story-without-
hero-or-ending/; Maha Hilal, Abu Ghraib: The legacy of torture in the war on terror,
AuAZEERA, Oct. 1, 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/abu-ghraib-legacy-
torture-war-terror-170928154012053.html; Reed Brody (Special Counsel with Human Rights
Watch), Getting Away with Torture? I Command Responsibility for the U.S. Abuse of
Detainees, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Apr. 23, 2005,
https://www.hrw.org/report/2005/04/23/getting-away-torure/command-responsibility-us-
abuse-detainees.
"6 Peter Foster, 9/11 judge facing calls to step down over Abu Ghraib trial, THE
TELEGRAPH, June 22, 2012, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/al-
qaeda/9349718/911 -judge-facing-calls-to-step-down-over-Abu-Ghraib-trial.html.
17 Samuel L. Brenner, "I Am A Bit Sickened": Examining Archetypes of Congressional
War Crimes Oversight after My Lai and Abu Ghraib, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN ANN ARBOR,
Mar. 2, 2010, https://works.bepress.com/samuelbrenner/3/.
6 [Vol. 25:1
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probe among the Republican majority in both Houses.'8 Media coverage
erupted again, however, in December of 2007 when CIA Director Michael
V. Hayden announced that two years earlier the CIA had destroyed ninety
(90) tapes of detainee interrogations involving CIA use of "enhanced
interrogation techniques."19 Although interest in the CIA's destruction of
tapes eventually receded from the cycle of breaking news to the attention of
the professionally concerned,2 0 the torture scandal was back in the news
after the November elections in 2008 transferred power to Democratic
control.2 1 That December, the Senate Armed Services Committee released a
report finding that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's approval of techniques
reverse engineered from the U.S. Military's Survival, Evasion, Resistance
and Escape (SERE) training program was a significant factor in the torture
of prisoners at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere. In May of 2009, Congressional
inquiry into the responsibility of lawyers in the Office of Legal Counsel
triggered another round of media attention, but even with the transfer of
power, these inquiries resulted in no domestic prosecutions of either the
23
principals or architects of the Bush Administration's torture policies.
Recently, the torture scandal has been in the news again. This is in part,
Id; The Truth About Abu Ghraib, WASH. POST, July 29, 2005,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/28/AR2005072801745.html;
Abu Ghraib: Congressional Investigation, SOURCEWATCH, May 21, 2008,
https://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/AbuGhraib: Congressional Investigation.
" Dan Eggen & Joby Warrick, CIA Destroyed Videos Showing Interrogations, WASH.
POST, Dec. 7, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/12/06/AR2007120601828.html; Matt Apuzzo, CIA Destroyed Tapes
Despite Court Order, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/12/12/AR2007121200213_pf.html; Nancy Pelosi, Hearing on
Destroyed CIA Tapes - Saltzburg's Testimony (C-SPAN), YOUTUBE (Dec. 20, 2007),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-1 SZs6 I TWRxo.
20 Douglas Cox, Burn After Viewing: The CIA's Destruction of the Abu Zubaydah Tapes
and the Law ofFederal Records, 5 J. NATL. SECUR. LAW POLICY 131 (2011).
21 Adam Nagourney, Obama Wins Election, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2008,
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/05/us/politics/05campaign.html.
I David Morgan, Senate report ties Rumsfeld to Abu Ghraib abuse, REUTERS, Dec. 11,
2008, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-abuse/senate-report-ties-rumsfeld-to-abu-ghraib-
abuse-idUSTRE4BA7JV20081211; COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, U. S. SENATE I10""




' What Went Wrong: Torture and the Office of Legal Counsel in the Bush
Administration: Hearing on 111-324 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Oversight and
the Courts of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (May 13, 2009),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg55467/html/CHRG-lllshrg55467.htm;
Christopher Weaver, The Men Behind the Memos, PROPUBLICA, Jan. 28, 2009,
https://www.propublica.org/article/the-men-behind-the-memos; David Cole, Rewarding
Impunity, FOREIGN POLICY, Oct. 18, 2012, https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/10/18/rewarding-
impunity/.
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because, in 2016, candidate Trumy ran for office on a platform of bringing
back torture "because it works."2 Even more recently, it's because rumors
began circulating in March of 2018 that Trump was planning to nominate
Gina Haspel to be the first woman to direct the CIA. Trump did in fact
nominate Haspel on April 17.25 On May 9t, the Senate Intelligence
Committee held its confirmation hearing on her nomination,26 and just after
taking in the conference proceedings on Rios Montt's genocide conviction
and reversal yesterday, I learned that the Senate had confirmed Haspel
earlier yesterday afternoon.27
Haspel's nomination was, and her confirmation is, controversial for two
reasons. In 2002, Haspel supervised a CIA black site in Thailand, where
detainees were re ortedly tortured in ways that "extended far beyond 'mere'
waterboarding."2 She was also involved in the destruction of the tapes of
CIA interrogations at the Thailand black site. Specifically, as Chief of Staff
to Jose Rodriguez, then director of the CIA's National Clandestine Service,
Haspel drafted the cable effectuating Rodriguez's order to have the tapes
destroyed. More generally, she reportedly was one of the main proponents of
destroying the tapes and, according to Rodriguez, understood that he was
taking the decision unilaterally and without higher authorization.29 Haspel's
24 Rebecca Gordon, Donald Trump Has a Passionate Desire to Bring Back Torture, THE
NATION, Apr. 6, 2017, https://www.thenation.com/article/donald-trump-has-a-passionate-
desire-to-bring-back-torture/; Adam Serwer, Can Trump Bring Back Torture?, THE ATLANTIC,
Jan. 26, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/trump-torture/514463/;
Trump's Draft Executive Order on Detention and Interrogation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/01/25/us/politics/document-Trump-draft-executive-
order-on-detention-and.html; Charlie Savage, Trump Poised to Lift Ban on C.I.A. 'Black Site'
Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/25/us/politics/cia-
detainee-prisons.html.
25 Deb Riechmann, Trump formally nominates Gina Haspel to be next CIA director, PBS
NEWSHOUR, Apr. 17, 2018, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/trump-formally-
nominates-gina-haspel-to-be-next-cia-director.
26 Matthew Rosenberg, Nicholas Fandos & Charlie Savage, Gina Haspel Vows at
Confirmation Hearing That She Would Not Allow Torture by C.I.A., N.Y. TIMES, May 9,2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/09/us/politics/gina-haspel-confirmation-hearing-live.html;
CIA Director Confirmation Hearing, C-SPAN (May 9, 2018), https://www.c-
span.org/video/?444988-1/gina-haspel-pledges-restart-cia-interrogation-program&live-
(featured video clips from Haspel confirmation hearing).
27 Jeremy Herb & Daniella Diaz, Controversial nominee Gina Haspel confirmed as first
female CIA director, CNN, May 17, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/17/politics/gina-
haspel-confirmation-vote/index.html.
2 Annabelle Timsit, What Happened at the Thailand 'Black Site' Run by Trump's CIA
Pick THE ATLANTIC, Mar. 14, 2018,
https://www.theatlantic.com/internationallarchive/2018/03/gina-haspel-black-site-torture-
cia/555539/; Chris Megerian, CIA reports detail harsh interrogations when chief Gina Haspel
led Thailand black site, Los ANGELES TIMES, Aug. 10, 2018,
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-gina-haspel-thailand-20180809-story.html.
2 Tim Golden, Haspel, Spies and Videotapes, PROPUBLICA, May 9, 2018,
8 [Vol. 25:1
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confirmation as Director of the CIA has elevated to a position of extreme
power and little accountability, a person who reportedly is willing to believe
30that torture is legal, that the destruction of evidence is justifiable, and who
promises to be guided by her "moral conpass," even as she refuses to opine
on the morality or immorality of torture.3 '
But that's not all that happened yesterday. May 17 th, 2018 was also the
one year "anniversary" of Robert Mueller's appointment as special counsel
32to investigate Russian interference in the 2016 presidential campaign. In
the space of this year, Trump has triggered several cycles of media frenzy
both by threatening to fire Mueller and by denying he made any such
threats.3 Denials notwithstanding, news that Trump was planning to fire
Mueller grabbed headlines as early as a month after Mueller's appointment,
when the Washington Post reported in June of 2017 that Mueller was
expanding the scope of his investigation to include potential obstruction of
justice b Trump in connection with his firing of James Comey as FBI
director. Trump reportedly backed down because his White House counsel,
Don McGahn, concluded that Trump's claims about Mueller's conflicts of
interest were inadequate bases for requesting Mueller's dismissal and
threatened to resign if Trump insisted on his demand to fire Mueller.35 In.
https://www.propublica.org/article/haspel-spies-and-videotape; Kevin Gosztola, Gina Haspel
Admits She Was An Advocate For Destroying CIA Torture Tapes, MINT PRESS NEWS, May 10,
2018, https://www.mintpressnews.com/gina-haspel-destroyed-cia-torture-tapes/241861/.
3 Claire Finkelstein & Stephen N. Xenakis, Lawyers Told Gina Haspel Torture Was
Legal. But It Never Was., N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.con2018/05/09/opinion/gina-haspel-cia-torture.html.
1 Megerian, supra note 28.
32 David Jackson, Donald Trump and lawyers blast Robert Mueller at Russia
investigation one-year anniversary, USA TODAY, May 17, 2018,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/05/17/donald-trump-and-lawyers-blast-
robert-mueller-one-year-anniversary/610676002/; Shannon Pettypiece, Trump to Use Mueller
One-Year Mark to Blast Probe, Giuliani Says, BLOOMBERG, May 15, 2018,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-15/trump-to-use-mueller-one-year-mark-
to-blast-probe-giuliani-says.
" Aaron Blake, Could lying about trying to fire Mueller put Trump in even more hot
water?, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2018/01/27/could-lying-about-attempting-to-fire-mueller-put-trump-in-even-more-hot-
water/?noredirect=on&utm term-.2bc 1382e26be.
3 Sophie Tatum & Kara Scannell, Trump denies he called for Mueller's firing, CNN,
Jan. 26, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/25/politics/donald-trump-robert-
mueller/index.html; Devlin Barrett et al., Special counsel is investigating Trump for possible




3 Kristen Walker & Phil Helsel, Trump wanted to fire Mueller in June but backed down
when White House counsel threatened to quit, NBC NEWS, Jan. 25, 2018,
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/trump-wanted-fire-mueller-june-backed-
92018]
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August, Trump denied he had ever attempted to fire Mueller. After attacking
Mueller's investigation as "a Democrat-created 'fabrication,"' Trump
nonetheless insisted that he hadn't given any thought to firing Mueller and
turned it on the media: "I've been reading about it from you people. You
say, 'Oh, I'm going to dismiss him.' No, I'm not dismissing anybody."36
In December 2017, Trump again reportedly tried to fire Mueller
believing that Mueller had subpoenaed Deutsche Bank for records of
Trump's finances.37 When later asked about reports that he tried to fire
Mueller, Trump told reporters at the Davos Summit on January 26, 2018 that
it was "fake news." "Fake news folks, fake news. Typical New York
Times," Trump insisted. And then in April, the day after FBI agents raided
the office and hotel room of Trump's personal attorney, Michael Cohen,
who was then reportedly under investigation inter alia for bank fraud, wire
fraud and campaign finance violations, Trump was again in the news
seething that Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein had signed off on the
raid and claiming that he had the power to fire Mueller. In a press briefing
about Syria, Trump attacked the raid on Cohen, attacked Mueller's
investigation as a "Witch Hunt," and his team as being "just about all
Democrats."3 9 "'Why don't I just fire Mueller?' Trump rhetorically asked,
then answered. 'Well, I think it's a disgrace what's going on. We'll see what
happens... Many people have said you should fire him. Again, they found
nothing. And in finding nothing, that's a big statement.'
That was April of 2018. This is May, and yesterday's news was
saturated with speculation about the likely fate of Mueller's investigation
given the chorus of Trump supporters proclaiming that a year is long enough
and that it is time now for Mueller to "wrap it up." 4 1 Although spokesman
down-reports-n841206 (reportedly Trump viewed the following as conflicts of interest
justifying dismissal: 1) a dispute over fees at Trump National Golf Club in Virginia when
Mueller was FBI director, 2) the fact that Mueller worked at a firm that had previously
represented his son in law and 3) the fact that Mueller had been interviewed to return as FBI
director the day before he was appointed special counsel on May 17th).
" Michael S. Schmidt, Trump Says He Has Not Considered Firing Mueller,
Contradicting Himself, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/10/us/politics/trump-mueller-considering-fired.html.
n Maggie Haberman & Michael S. Schmidt, Trump Sought to Fire Mueller in December,
N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 12, 2018, https://www.nytimes.comr/2018/04/10/us/politics/trump-sought-to-
fire-mueller-in-december.html.
" Blake, supra note 33; Marshall Cohen & Aileen Graef, 8 times since June the White
House denied Trump was considering firing Mueller, CNN, Jan. 26, 2018,
https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/25/politics/robert-mueller-donald-trump/index.html.
" Jeremy Diamond, Trump slams FBI for raid of his personal attorney's office, CNN,
Apr. 9, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/09/politics/donald-trump-fbi-michael-
cohen/index.html.
4 Id.
41 Darren Samuelsohn, Trump team ready to 'pressure' Mueller at probe's one-year
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Rudy Giuliani did not expressly threaten Trump would fire Mueller, Giuliani
referred to Trump's team having a "Plan B and C" if Mueller fails to heed
the smoke signals.4 2
Mueller is a registered Republican. He was appointed by Deputy
Attorney General Rod Rosenstein, who was nominated for that position by
none other than Donald Trump himself. Ordinarily, the Attorney General
would have been the one to appoint Mueller, but Jeff Sessions had to recuse
himself, when it was revealed on March 1, 2017 that Sessions had had two
previously undisclosed conversations with Russia's Ambassador to the
United States during the 2016 presidential campaign.43 Although Trump
continues to resent Sessions for recusing himself, blames Sessions for
Mueller's appointment and opportunistically subjects Sessions to a variety of
pressure tactics from open insults, calls for his resignation, and demands that
he 'un-recuse' himself," the reason Sessions offered for his recusal is worth
noting.
According to Sessions, a Department of Justice regulation, 28 CFR 45.2
required his recusal because it prohibits DOJ employees from participating
in criminal investigations or prosecutions if the person has a political or
personal relationship with anyone substantially involved in the conduct that,
mark, POLITICO, May 16, 2018, https://politi.co/2wLAZ9; Liz Peek, One year after
Mueller's free-for-all began the costs are incredibly high and Putin is the only real winner,
Fox NEWS, May 17, 2018, http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2018/05/17/one-year-after-
muellers-free-for-all-began-costs-are-incredibly-high-and-putin-is-only-real-winner.html;
Elizabeth Landers, Mike Pence tells Mueller 'it's time to wrap it up', CNN, May 10, 2018,
https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/10/politics/mike-pence-robert-mueller-investigationlindex.html;
Matt Ford, How Many Years Will Robert Mueller Need?, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 17, 2018,
https://newrepublic.com/article/148451/many-years-will-robert-mueller-need.
42 Pettypiece, supra note 32. Not all one year reviews of Mueller's probe were hostile.
Sara Murray, Evan Perez & Dana Bash, Hot Pockets, mismatched chairs and a critical
mission: Inside year one of the Mueller investigation, CNN, May 17, 2018,
https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/17/politics/robert-mueller-investigation-one-year-
inside/index.html; Heather Dockray & Marcus Glimer, Breaking down Trump's tweets after a
whole year of the Mueller investigation, MASHABLE, May 17, 2018,
https://mashable.com/2018/05/17/robert-mueller-one-year-anniversary-trump-
tweets/#LbJ6G5pVLaqy; Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux, How Mueller's First Year Compares To
Watergate, Iran-Contra And Whitewater, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT, May 17, 2018,
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-muellers-first-year-compares-to-watergate-iran-
contra-and-whitewater/.
43 Madeleine Sheehan Perkins & Harrison Jacobs, Here's how a special prosecutor
investigating Trump and Russia would get appointed, BUSINESS INSIDER, Mar. 3, 2017,
https://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-special-prosecutor-trump-russia-jeff-sessions-
congress-2017-2; Pema Levy, A timeline ofJeffSessions' recusal violations, MOTHER JONES,
Jan. 31, 2018, https://www.mothejones.com/politics/2018/01/a-timeline-of-jeff-sessions-
recusal-violations/.
4 Mike Murphy, Trump told Sessions to un-recuse himself in Russia probe: report,
MARKETWATCH, May 29, 2018, https://www.marketwatch.com/story/trump-told-sessions-to-
un-recuse-himself-in-russia-probe-report-2018-05-29.
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is the sub)ect of the investigation or would be directly affected by the
outcome. Sessions' claim was that he had recused himself because of his
role as an advisor and surrogate for Trump in the 2016 presidential
campaign, and not because of the uproar triggered by the fact that Sessions
had previously denied meeting with Russian officials during the campaign
when questioned about it at his confirmation hearing before the Senate
Judiciary Committee.
Speculation continues,4 7 but whatever the reasons, Sessions' recusal
passed the decision whether to appoint a special counsel to Rosenstein, who
as Acting Attorney General issued the order for Mueller's appointment on
May 17, 2017." The purpose of the appointment was "to ensure a full and
thorough investigation of the Russian government's efforts to interfere in the
2016 presidential election."4 9 The saga of Russian efforts to throw the U.S.
presidency to Trump now morphed into the saga of Mueller's inquiry into
that intervention.so
So Gina Haspel's confirmation as CIA Director and Robert Mueller's
tenuous one-year tenure as special counsel were the two big stories in U.S.
news on May 17, 2018, and the question for us today is what these two
stories have to do with the genocide conviction of Rios Montt? What do
these stories have to do with Guatemala? What do they have to do with each
other? Answering these questions is the way I want to illustrate the
significance not only of historical memory, but of legal theory, specifically
its significance as a field of battle over concepts and doctrines. This is
because in order to see the connections among these seemingly unconnected
stories, you really have to go deep into history and deep into legal theory.
45 Eliza Relman, Jeff Sessions explains why he recused himself rom Trump campaign-
related investigations, BuSINEss INSIDER, June 13, 2017,
https://www.businessinsider.com/jeff-sessions-on-recusing-himself-trump-investigation-
russia-2017-6.
I John Nichols, Jeff Sessions Keeps Lying to the Senate, THE NATION, Oct. 18, 2017,
https://www.thenation.com/article/jeff-sessions-keeps-lying-to-the-senate/.
47 Jeff Greenfield, Why Sessions Recused Himself POLITICO, Mar. 2, 2017,
https://www.politico.com/magazinestory/2017/03/sessions-recuses-himself-trump-russia-
214857.
48 OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY Arr'Y GEN., ORDER NO. 3915-2017, APPOINTmENT OF
SPECIAL COUNSEL TO INVESTIGATE RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE WITH THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL
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II. OF COLLUDING PRESIDENTS, INDEPENDENT COUNSELS AND
ORIGINAL INTENT
I begin with Mueller's investigation. There is so much to say about this
investigation that it is important to clarify from the outset that my
presentation is not about the investigation per se. It is rather about the legal
structure that creates the conditions of vulnerability in which this
investigation has had to unfold under the uncertainty of constant threats that
Trump may or may not be about to fire Mueller at any given moment. It's
about why this structure exists, the history of this structure, what it reveals
about the nature of structural corruption and impunity, and some conjectures
about alternative possible futures.
The reason Mueller is vulnerable to Trump's threats of dismissal is this:
Mueller was appointed, and can be dismissed, by a political appointee in the
executive branch who serves entirely at the pleasure of the President, who
may or may not be or become a target of Mueller's investigation. More
specifically, as Deputy Attorney General, Rosenstein appointed Mueller
under the statutory authority of 28 U.S.C. §§ 509, 510, and 515 5 and
Department of Justice [hereinafter DOJ] regulation 28 CFR Section 600.4-
600.10.52 The regulation is particularly noteworthy because it establishes the
bases and procedures for termination of the special counsel. Specifically it
provides in § 600.7 that while the special counsel is not subject to the day-
to-day supervision of any official in the DOJ, the special counsel must
comply with the rules, regulations, procedures, practices and policies of the
Department of Justice and consult with appropriate offices within the
Department for guidance regarding these practices. In addition, under.§600.7
(b), the Attorney General may request explanations from the special counsel
regarding any particular investigative or prosecutorial step, and may decide
that such step should not be pursued. Although the AG must report and
explain such vetoes to Congress, this report is not due until after the
investigation has been concluded, and there is no appeal from the AG's veto.
Under these provisions, the special counsel is subject to the Justice
Department's "Urgent Reports" procedures.53 This means that Mueller must
notify Justice Department leadership, in this case Deputy AG Rosenstein, of
any "major developments in significant investigations and litigation," "law
5' OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATT'Y GEN., supra note 48; Marty Lederman, Mueller Wasn't
Appointed Pursuant o the DOJ Regs (and other assorted flaws in the Manafort suit), JUST
SECURITY, Jan. 4, 2018, https://www.justsecurity.org/50434/flaws-manaforts-suit-including-
fundamental-mistaken-assumption-rosenstein-appointed-muller-pursuant-doj-regulations/.
s2 28 CFR Part 600- GENERAL POWERS OF SPECIAL COUNSEL, LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/28/part-600 (last visited Aug. 23, 2018); OFFICE OF THE
DEPUTY ATT'Y GEN., supra note 48.
5 1-13.000 - Urgent Reports, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE (updated Apr. 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-1-13000-urgent-reports (last visited Aug. 26,2018).
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enforcement emergencies," or events affecting the department hat are likely
to generate national media or Congressional attention.m These reports are
due at least three days in advance of the anticipated developments or events.
They are designed to give leadership notice and, in this case, give
Rosenstein the opportunity to stop Mueller or inform Trump of forthcoming
actions like the execution of a search warrant of the offices of Trump's
personal attorney, the indictment of his former campaign manager, and the
like. Writing for Vox shortly after Mueller's appointment, Daniel Hemel
noted the difficulty of conducting an investigation "when someone so close
to your target knows your every move well in advance."ss This structure
makes the integrity and continuing viability of Mueller's investigation
depend in no small part on Rosenstein's interest in preserving his
professional reputation as a career prosecutor as opposed to a political hack.
Not only can Rosenstein stop Mueller's intended moves pursuant to the
Urgent Reports procedures, he can also fire Mueller. Under the regulations,
grounds for removal of a special counsel are misconduct, dereliction of duty,
incapacity, conflict of interest, or for other good cause, including violation
of Departmental policies. Rosenstein would have to inform Mueller in
writing of the specific reason for his or her removal, but under §600.10, the
regulations expressly provide that they are not intended to, do not, and may
not be relied upon to create any rights.
What this means, in a nutshell, is this. While Trump cannot directly fire
Mueller, Trump can fire the one person who can fire Mueller. That's Rod
Rosenstein, the Deputy Attorney General. Rosenstein serves at the pleasure
of the president, which means that -Trump has a potentially very powerful
way of stopping Mueller. He can order Rosenstein to fire Mueller, and
Rosenstein will understand that if he doesn't fire Mueller, he himself may be
fired by Trump. Now the question whether Trump is going to fire Mueller
has been as much a subject of speculation as the question whether Trump is
or is not a target of Mueller's investigation, and it is not at all surprising that
the two matters have been repeatedly linked in the drama of threats and
denials.56 This observable linkage is an unsurprising consequence of the
inherent structural conflict of interest of an arrangement of power in which a
prosecutor is tasked with investigating a situation that may eventually end up
implicating his or her "boss," defined quite practically as the person who has
the power to terminate his investigation by the simple expedient of firing
him
4 Id.
s Daniel Hemel, Free Robert Mueller: here's how to make his investigation truly
independent, VOX, May 29, 2017, https://www.vox.com/the-big-
idea/2017/5/24/15682544/mueller-comey-independent-investigation-special-counsel.
' Sonam Sheth, We now know of a second instance in which Trump reportedly wanted
Mueller fired, BuSINEss INsIDER, Apr. 10, 2018, https://www.businessinsider.con/trump-
wanted-mueller-fired-deutsche-bank-subpoena-2018-4.
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The reaction to Mueller's evident vulnerability and Trump's repeated
indications that he is willing to go there but for the institutional and
procedural obstacles in his path has been a distracting subplot of calls to
protect Mueller's investigation, further calls to protect Rosenstein, and
protective bills introduced in both the House and Senate, amid adamant
disclaimers that the bills are unnecessary and will not be taken up for a vote
because the President isn't going to fire the Special Counsel. We could
spend time talking about the Special Counsel Independence Protection Act
introduced by Representative Sheila Jackson in August of 2017. 1 This bill
provides that in order to terminate the special counsel the Attorney General
would have to file suit in DC court and prove cause.s The Special Counsel
Integrity Act is another bill introduced in the House in December 2017.59 A
similar bill in the Senate6 was blocked from vote by Senate Majority Leader
Mitch McConnell.61 In April of 2018, a new bill merging elements of each
of the two prior bills was jointly sponsored by Senators Booker, Graham,
Coons, and Tillis as the Special Counsel Independence and Integrity Act. 62
Under this bill, the special counsel can only be fired by a Justice Department
official for good cause in writing. The bill would give the special counsel 10
days to get expedited judicial review. The removal would not take effect and
the special counsel's investigation would be preserved while this judicial
review takes place. The merged bill advanced in the Senate Committee6 3
notwithstanding earlier McConnell no vote on floor," but to date it
languishes.
In my view, the drama over these bills is really a distraction because the
bills are actually the fallout of a bigger story. This is the story of how we
came to find ourselves in a situation in which a special counsel, whose office
was established precisely in order to avoid conflicts of interests from
11 Special Counsel Independence Protection Act, H.R.3654, 115th Cong. (2018).
5' For the Senate version of the same bill see also Special Counsel Independence
Protection Act, S.1735, 115th Cong. (2018).
5 Special Counsel Independence and Integrity Act, H.R.5476, 115th Cong. (2018).
1 Special Counsel Integrity Act, S.1741, 115th Cong. (2017).
61 Nash Jenkins, These Bills Would Prevent Donald Trump From Firing Robert Mueller.
They're Going Nowhere,j TIME, Jan. 26, 2018, http://time.com/5120851/trump-mueller-
special-counsel-senate-judiciary/.
62 Booker, Graham, Coons, Tillis introduce merged legislation, the Special Counsel
Independence and Integrity Act, Cory Booker I U.S. Senator for New Jersey (Apr. 11, 2018),
https://www.booker.senate.gov/?id-769&p=press-release.
63 Tara Golshan, The Senate bill to protect Robert Mueller's Russia investigation,
explained, VOx, Apr. 26, 2018, https://www.vox.com/2018/4/26/17274824/senate-bill-robert-
mueller-russia-trump-fire.
6 Deirdre Shesgreen, McConnell: No Senate vote on bill to protect Special Counsel
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undermining the integrity of federal criminal investigations and prosecutions
of persons holding high office, is appointed by a Deputy Attorney General,
who received his appointment authority by way of the Attorney General's
recusal pursuant to another departmental regulation also designed to prevent
conflicts of interests, nonetheless serves at the pleasure of a political
appointee, who himself serves at the pleasure of the President, who may or
may not be the target of special counsel's investigation. A structure of power
more likely to be affected by conflicts of interest is hard to imagine. To the
extent the special counsel is subordinate, in this case, to the Deputy Attorney
General and the Deputy Attorney General is subordinate to the President,
there is a possibility that neither will have the independence necessary to
follow the evidence wherever it leads, especially if it leads to the President
who holds their jobs on the line. So the question, again, is how this structure
came to be. That is the story that I want to tell, and this story is going to
circle around a Supreme Court case that is the site of the legal battle I am
interested in. The case is Morrison v. Olson.6 5
Morrison v. Olson was decided in 1988. It took up the constitutionality
of the Ethics in Government Act, which was enacted in 1978 in response to
what is famously known as Nixon's "Saturday Night Massacre." On
Saturday, October 20, 1973, Nixon ordered the Attorney General to fire the
special prosecutor, Archibald Cox, who was then demanding that Nixon
surrender nine tape recordings of White House conversations relevant to
Cox's investigation of Nixon's role in covering up a burglary of the
Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate complex.6
Nixon ordered Cox to drop his investigation. When Cox refused, Nixon
ordered Attorney General Elliot Richardson to fire him. When Richardson
refused, Nixon accepted Richardson's resignation, turned to the Deputy
Attorney General, William Ruckelhaus, and ordered Rucklehaus to fire Fox.
When Ruckelshaus refused, Nixon accepted his resignation and turned to the
Solicitor General, Robert Bork. Bork fired Cox. Although Bork's colleagues
have defended his decision to do as Nixon asked , his firing of the special
prosecutor trigered massive criticism at the time and shadowed Bork for the
rest of his life. For Nixon, Cox's firing fueled support for a credible threat
of impeachment that forced him to resign. The point here is that Nixon did
exactly what observers today fear Trump may try to do to get rid of Mueller.
61 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
6 Kenneth B. Noble, Bork Irked by Emphasis on His Role in Watergate, N.Y. TIMES,
July 2, 1987.
67 Robert Bork Jr., Elliot Richardson's testimony Robert Bork's role in the Saturday
Night Massacre, C-SPAN (Sept. 29, 1987), https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4677380/elliot-
richardsons-testimony-robert-borks-role-saturday-night-massacre.
6 On This Day: Senate rejects Robert Bork for the Supreme Court, NATIONAL
CONSTrTUTION CENTER, (Oct. 23, 2017), https://constitutioncenter.org/blogon-this-day-
senate-rejects-robert-bork-for-the-supreme-court.
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Nixon threw the stability of the government into question by firing top
leadership at the DOJ and threatening to continue down the chain of
command until he reached a subordinate who would carry out his order to
fire Special Prosecutor Cox. Bork stopped the so-called massacre, but only
by capitulating to the corrupt demands of a corrupt president.
Five years later, Congress enacted the Ethics in Government Act
precisely in order to deal with the problem of a corrupt president ordering
the dismissal of a special prosecutor appointed to investigate crimes in high
office that may implicate the president. What the Ethics in Government Act
did is actually very simple. It moved the power of appointment from the
Attorney General to a specially constituted Division of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The Special Division was
made up of three judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme
Court. Upon request by the Attorney General, the panel was tasked with
appointing an independent counsel and defining the scope of the
investigation.
The Office of Independent Counsel established by the Ethics in
Government Act was different from the office of special prosecutor held by
Cox. Pursuant to the statute, the Independent Counsel was appointed by the
Court and could be removed by the Attorney General only for good cause
and subject to judicial review, since the Independent Counsel had the right
under the statute to appeal his dismissal to the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia and could be reinstated by the court. The common
sense idea informing the statute was that when there is enough credible
information of criminal activity to constitute grounds for a criminal
investigation of persons in high office with close relationships to the
president, persons who may be friends, allies and possibly even agents of the
illegal actions of a president, then you need to have a prosecutorial power
that cannot be fired at will at the pleasure of the president. The
constitutionality of this statute was challenged in Morrison v. Olson.
Theodore Olson, the plaintiff in Morrison, was Assistant Attorney
General for the Office of Legal Counsel [hereinafter "OLC"] during the
Reagan Administration. The OLC assists the Attorney General in advising
the president and all agencies of the executive branch. OLC legal opinions
6 28 U.S.C. § 596 (2011).
7 The statute authorized appointment of an independent counsel in cases involving
suspected criminal activity of the president, the vice president, a member of the president's
cabinet, a high-level executive officer, a high-level Justice Department official, the director or
deputy director of the CIA, the commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, any person with
a personal or financial relationship with the attorney general or any other officer in the
Department of Justice, or the president's campaign chair or treasurer. See Independent Counsel
- Ethics in Government Act, LAW LIBRARY AMERICAN LAW AND LEGAL INFORMATION (last
visited Aug. 24, 2018), http://law.jrank.org/pages/7601/lndependent-Counsel-Ethics-in-
Government-Act.html.
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are generally treated as authoritative statements of the law within the
executive branch and have been used as "safe havens" against prosecutions
for executive officers purporting to rely on an OLC opinion.7 1 The charges
against Olson were that Olson had given false and misleading testimony
before a House Judiciary committee investigating the E.P.A.'s earlier refusal
to produce documents subpoenaed by the House Energy and Commerce
72Committee. The Energy and Commerce Committee was investigating toxic
waste dumps and allegations that Reagan Administration officials were
awarding superfund moneys based on partisan considerations rather than
environmental ones.73 Acting on OLC instructions, the E.P.A. administrator
invoked executive privilege to withhold the subpoenaed documents.7 4 The
Administrator was held in contempt and forced to resign and Olson was later
called to testify about his role in advising the E.P.A. administrator to
withhold documents from Congress.75 The Justice Department submission
requesting appointment of an Independent Counsel reportedly noted several
instances during Olson's testimony where he may have lied to the
committee, including his failure to "recall being told that E.P.A. officials
were willing to turn over the disputed documents to Congress."76
Olson responded by filing suit to challenge the constitutionality of the
Ethics in Government Act, specifically the provisions of the Act establishing
n1 In 2008, for example, Attorney General Michael Mukasy, testified before the House
Judiciary Committee stated that "the Justice Department ... could not investigate or prosecute
somebody for acting in reliance on a Justice Department opinion." See Oversight Hearing of
the Department of Justice: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong.
(2008).
n David Neiwert, The first Ted Olson scandal, SALON, May 14, 2001,
https://www.salon.com/2001/05/14/independent-counsel/.
" Id; see also Mary Thornton, Gorsuch Being Called To Tell Hill Why She Withheld
Data, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 1982,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/10/27/gorsuch-being-called-to-tell-
hill-why-she-withheld-data/15654ec4-3cOd-4148-9435-
7da7af473eab/?noredirect-on&utm term-=.d0eal I caf75c.
74 Thornton, supra note 73.
7 Philip Shabecoff, House Charges Head ofE.P.A. with Contempt, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17,
1982, https://www.nytimes.com/1 982/12/17/us/house-charges-head-of-epa-with-
contempt.html; see also David Hoffman & Cass Peterson, Burford Quits as EPA
Administrator, THE WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 1983,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1 983/03/10/burford-quits-as-epa-
administrator/49efiadd-f834-4bef-8fd5-35fl3dlf2abd/?utm-term-.2532914f6d86; see also
Philip Shenon & Special To the New York Times, Special Prosecutor Drops E.P.A. Case
Without Indictment, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1988,
https://www.nytimes.com/1988/08/27/us/special-prosecutor-drops-epa-case-without-
indictment.html.
76 Shenon and Times, supra note 75; see also Robert L. Jackson, Widened Probe of 1983
EPA Scandal Denied, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1987, http://articles.latimes.com/1987-04-
03/news/mn-2458_lindependent-counsel.
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the procedures for appointment and removal of the independent counsel.
Some aspects of the case are highly technical. I am referring here, for
example, to the debate whether the section of the Appointments Clause
empowering Congress to vest appointment of inferior officers "in the
President alone, in the courts of Law, or in the Heads of Department" applies
to inter-branch appointments or is limited to intra-branch appointments.
This and other technical doctrines at issue in the case deal with matters
peculiar to a method of interpretation that focuses on giving effect to the
original intent of the Framers as expressed in the words of the Constitutional
text and reflected in the records of the Constitutional Convention. These
technicalities may not be immediately or particularly relevant to the struggle
against corruption and impunity in other countries, but the central question
of constitutional interpretation at issue in Morrison v. Olson is certainly of
broad significance and makes it a very interesting case. That is the issue of
the separation of powers.
Writing for a majority of the Court, then Chief Justice Rehnquist
concluded that the independent counsel statute did not violate the separation
of powers either by vesting appointment of the independent counsel in a
specially created federal court or by imposing a "good cause" restriction on
the Attorney General's power to remove the Independent Counsel and
subjecting such removal to judicial review. According to the Court,
Congress could reasonably conclude that investigations of criminal activities
by high-ranking officers in the executive branch created conflicts of interests
that required Congress to take steps to secure the independence of the
prosecutors involved in investigating and prosecuting such cases.77 Although
Congress could not constitutionally allocate to itself the power of appointing
a prosecutor to investigate and prosecute executive officers, it was entirely
reasonable for Congress to conclude that the power of appointing and
removing such a prosecutor needed to be vested in a way to protect against
conflicts of interest. It was also entirely reasonable for Congress to view the
judicial branch as a logical place to assign that power as federal courts have
extensive experience appointing federal marshals, interim U.S. Attorneys,
and private attorneys to prosecute contempt judgments all of which either
are executive branch officers or involve the exercise of executive powers.
In so holding, the Court rejected the argument that Congress lacked the
power to impose good cause restrictions on the removal of officers whose
functions were "purely executive." Even conceding that criminal prosecutors
exercise "purely executive" powers, the Court reasoned that the
determination of which officers may or may not be subject to at will removal
by the president did not turn on "rigid categories," but rather on an analysis
of whether the President needed the power of at-will removal in order to
fulfill his duty to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed" without
n Morrison, 487 U.S. at 677.
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Congressional interference. While there are some purely executive officers
who must be removable at will by the President if the President is to have
effective control of his administration, the President's power to remove
officials is not absolute, but depends on the nature of the duties of the
officials whose removal is at issue, the kind of tenure Congress provided for
the office they hold, and whether the power to remove the officials is
essential to the President's proper execution of his Article II powers. In the
case of the Independent Counsel, an office established by Congress to
prevent conflicts of interests in the executive branch from interfering with
the investigation and prosecution of criminal activity by friends and allies of
the president or the president himself, the Court decided that the president's
duties to take care and faithfully execute the laws did not require at will
removal power over the person appointed to that office.
Justice Scalia was the lone dissenter in this case. On the separation of
powers question, his position was categorical. Since the power exercised by
the independent counsel was "purely executive," the power of appointment
and removal of the independent counsel was constitutionally vested in the
President, and the Court's decision was nothing short of lawless. For Scalia,
"A government of laws means a government of rules. Today's decision on
the basic issue of fragmentation of executive power is ungoverned by rule,
and hence ungoverned by law."78 Now there are a number of things that are
quite interesting about Scalia's dissent in Morrison. The first is the sheer
sophistry of it, and I mean "sophistry" in the literal sense, for sophistry is the
art of making the real appear unreal and the unreal appear real.79 Why is this
so? Let me quickly sketch out three ways in which the dissent is entirely
sophistic.
First, consider that the prologue with which Scalia begins his dissent
opens by explaining that the proud boast of Americans that we have "a
government of laws and not of men" comes from the Massachusetts
Constitution of 1780 which provided for the categorical separation of
powers. There is certainly irony in Scalia's history lesson, for while he
begins with this foundational principle and assertion of national identity, the
outcome of his dissent tends entirely in the direction of consolidating a
government of men, not laws-more precisely a government of men whose
discretion not to prosecute themselves for their own criminal activity, Scalia
will characterize later in the opinion as a "natural advantage of the
President"8 0 conferred by a Constitution in which the prosecution of every
violation of law, "especially every violation by those in high places... is not
" Morrison, 487 U.S. at 733 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
7 See Plato, Sophist, THE INTERNET CLASSICS ARCHIVE,
http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/sophist.html (last visited Aug 26, 2018).
8 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 712 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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an absolutely overriding value."81 Thus, Scalia starts his dissent by
purporting to teach us that we must maintain a categorical separation of
powers if we are to be true to our national boast of having a government of
laws and not men, and ends by defending the legal impunity such a
categorical separation would confer upon the executive, assuring us along
the way that the enforcement of law against persons in high office is actually
not an overriding value.
Second, consider Scalia's use of Federalist Paper 47, which he cites to
establish that the framers of the federal constitution viewed the separation of
powers as "the absolutely central guarantee of a just government."82 Scalia
quotes Madison as attesting that no political truth is of greater intrinsic value
and concludes that failure to maintain the separation of powers will render
our Bill of Rights as worthless as those of "many nations of the world that
have adopted, or even improved upon, the mere words of ours." What
Scalia neglects to mention is that Federalist 47 is actually Madison's
extended defense of the intermixture ofpowers in the U.S. Constitution. The
text Scalia quotes is Madison's concession to the. groupthink of his
contemporaries, who were then invoking the oracle of Montesquieu to attack
the proposed Constitution for its intermixtures of power. In Federalist 4Z,
Madison reminds them that none of the constitutions of their 13 states kept
the legislative, executive and judicial powers entirely separate and distinct,
including the Massachusetts constitution which Scalia invokes as example of
a categorical separation. Since Madison specifically raises the intermixture
of powers in the Massachusetts constitution as evidence that even
constitutions that expressly assert the absolute and categorical separation of
powers nonetheless find a partial intermixture necessary and proper, Scalia's
references to the Massachusetts constitution and to Madison's argument in
Federalist 47 are both patently misleading.
Scalia also neglects to explain why Madison was so keen to defend the
Constitution's intermixtures of power. At the end of Federalist 47, Madison
explains his reason when he notes that none of the states have made "a
competent 8 rovision... for maintaining in practice the separation delineated
on paper." In the next four papers, we learn more. Madison believed that
political recurrence to the people to enforce the separation of powers is a
recipe for disaster, whether that return is made periodically or in response to
a particular crisis. Rather than relying on the people to resolve constitutional
crises or correct usurpations of power, Madison argued that the checks on
power must be made internal to the operation of government and that
81 Id. at 732 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
8 Id. at 697 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
' THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison), available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th-century/fed47.asp.
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intermixtures of power are precisely the way to do that." The point is that
Madison is completely misrepresented if he is cast as a proponent of the
categorical separation of powers, for he quite expressly viewed the
separation of powers as depending in practice on the intelligent and strategic
intermixture of powers, and would thus in all likelihood be a proponent of
the Ethics in Government Act precisely to the extent its intermixtures of
power make effective in practice the fundamental axiom informing the
separation of powers: that "[n]o man is allowed to be a judge in his own
cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not
improbably, corrupt his integrity."
The last thing I want to note about Scalia's dissent is the way he makes
fairness to the accused the focus of his case for subordinating all
prosecutorial power to "the unitary executive." It's really quite remarkable.
In Scalia's account, we are asked to imagine a panel of politically partisan
judges, "as judges have been known to be," selecting "a prosecutor
antagonistic to the administration, or even to the particular individual," who
then proceeds to abuse the power of prosecutorial discretion. Scalia notes
that "There is no remedy for that, not even a political one," and further
observes that "even if it were entirely evident that unfairness was in fact the
result-the judges hostile to the administration, the independent counsel an
old foe of the President, the staff refugees from the recently defeated
administration-there would be no one accountable to the public to whom
the blame could be assigned."86 Thus, the only way to secure fairness to the
individual is to permit the concentration of prosecutorial power in the
president because that is the only way to ensure that prosecutorial discretion
is accountable to the people.
It is remarkable that a reasonable intermixture of power allocating to a
court the power to appoint and review the removal of a prosecutor so as to
prevent conflicts of interest in the executive branch from undermining the
independence of investigations into criminal activities of persons in high
executive office is cast as inherently unfair by positing the complete collapse
of professional integrity and fairness not only in the independent counsel but
in the judges who appointed her. The risk of impunity for the crimes of the
powerful is, in this view, offset by the risk of a complete failure of
professional ethics among those appointed to investigate, such that only the
accountability of the unitary executive to the people can be counted on to
save the republic. But, Scalia's reliance on the people, rather than on
institutional checks made internal to the operation of government and the
4 See THE FEDERALIST No. 48-51 (James Madison), available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subjectmenus/fed.asp.
85 THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th-century/fedlO.asp.
8 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 730-31 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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virtue of the persons raised to positions of high office and public trust, runs
counter to the foundational assumptions informing the republican form of
government defended in the Federalist Papers, which he so profoundly
distorts.
Although the people are sovereign and their consent essential to the
government's legitimacy, they are also vulnerable to demagogues and deceit.
For this reason, the virtue necessary for self-government is required as much
from persons whose qualifications for office include professional training in
the obligations of their office, as the people empowered to remove them
from office. This understanding is at work in Rehnquist's response to the
specter of partisan judges construing their supervisory power over the
independent counsel as a .'broadsword and... rapier' [enabling] the court to
'control the pace and depth of the independent counsel's activities."'
Rehnquist's response was quite simple: federal courts have a duty to
construe their own power constitutionally.87 Rather than reinforcing the
ethical standards applicable to federal prosecutors and judges-noting for
example that these standards of professionalism and integrity are what
justify such constitutional privileges as life tenure for judges-Scalia instead
insists that the constitutionality of the independent counsel statute must be
construed in contemplation of a complete failure of virtue by prosecutor and
judges.88 But Scalia's approach does not cohere with the understanding
evidenced by a fair reading of the Federalist Papers. No doubt, these papers
recount a concerted effort to design a form of government that attempts to
counteract the vices of human nature through a carefully engineered system
of separation and intermixture of powers, but it is also true that its ultimate
success was understood to depend as well on the virtue of those raised to
positions of trust. Thus Madison concluded his argument in defense of the
structure of power in the House, not by referencing the categorical
separation of powers, but by referencing the significant role of virtue in the
success of republican government:
As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires
a certain degree of circumspection and distrust, so there are
other qualities in human nature which justify a certain
portion of esteem and confidence. Republican government
presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher
degree than any other form. Were the pictures which have
been drawn by the political jealousy of some among us
* Morrison, 487 U.S. at 682 ("[1]t is the duty of federal courts to construe a statute to
save it from constitutional infirmities").
8 Id. at 731 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he fairness of a process must be adjudged on the
basis of what it permits to happen, not what it produced in a particular case.") Scalia's point is
that the structure of the office, as constituted by the Ethics Act, should be declared
unconstitutional because it would permit an unethical independent counsel and special division
to conspire with impunity in the abuse of power.
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faithful likenesses of the human character, the inference
would be, that there is not sufficient virtue among men for
self-government; and that nothing less than the chains of
despotism can restrain them from destroying and devouring
one another. 89
in. OF HISTORICAL MEMORY, LEGAL THEORY AND CONVERGING
PATHS
Assuming you are now persuaded that Scalia's dissent in Morrison is
all wrong, the question is this: why should we care about Scalia's dissent?
After all, the fact that it is a dissent means it didn't emerge as controlling
law, and Scalia is no longer on the Court, so really, why care? The answer to
that question is the part of this story that takes us forward in time. By
following the story forward in time we will see how yesterday's news about
Gina Haspel's confirmation as director of the CIA and Robert Mueller's
tenuous first year as Special Counsel are connected at the crossroads of the
two paths that did emerge from the Court's decision in Morrison. The first
path moves forward in what we can call the world of human events; the
second is in the world of legal theory.
A. First Path: The Destruction of the Independent Counsel
The first path forward is by way of the fact that while the Court's
decision in Morrison upheld the constitutionality of the Ethics in
Government Act, the statute had a sunset provision. Although it was
reauthorized several times, a Republican filibuster . prevented its
reauthorization when it lapsed in December 1992.9 Then in 1993, the
Clinton Administration was rocked by political storms over the death of
Clinton's White House Counsel, Vincent Foster, and its possible relationship
to Clinton's land dealings. Clinton's Attorney General, Janet Reno,
responded by appointing a special prosecutor, Robert Fiske, in January
1994.91 In the meantime, Clinton publicly embraced the idea of the Office
of the Independent Counsel, dismissed criticisms that it was a partisan tool
and waste of money, and, in July 1994, signed a reauthorization bill calling
the independent counsel "a foundation stone for the trust between the
89 THE FEDERALIST, supra note 84.
9 Jim Mokhiber, A Brief History Of The Independent Counsel Law, PBS, May 1998,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/counsel/office/history.html.
` David Johnston, Counsel Granted A Broad Mandatein Clinton Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 21, 1994, https://www.nytimes.com1994/01/21/us/counsel-granted-a-broad-nandate-in-
clinton-inquiry.html.
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Government and our citizens."9
After reauthorization, Reno submitted the matter of Fiske's
investigation to the Special Division. The three judge panel appointed by
Chief Justice Rehnquist was headed by Appeals Court Judge David
Sentelle.93 The other two judges were John Butzner and Joseph Sneed,94 but
it was basically Sentelle's show.95 Prior to his appointment to the Special
Division, Sentelle had a notable political career as the Republican Party
chair of a county in North Carolina. His political activities earned him the
support of N.C. Senator Jesse Helms, who nominated him to the federal
bench and pushed for his elevation to the D.C. Court of Appeals. On the
bench, Sentelle promptly distinguished himself as being "on the extreme
right wing of a decidedly right-wing circuit... so far out there that he's
alienated his fellow conservatives."%
Now, despite the fact that Fiske was a Republican, a former U.S.
Attorney, and had been given broad authority to conduct a thorough,
complete and impartial investigation, Sentelle's panel removed Fiske,
announcing that purpose of the statute was to protect against perceptions of
conflict of interests. Fiske presumably was irreparably tainted because Reno
had appointed him, and the panel appointed Kenneth Starr to replace Fiske
that August.9 Starr's appointment was controversial from the beginning, not
because Starr, like Fiske, was a staunch Republican, but more specifically
because Starr had already come out against Clinton in the Paula Jones case,
even consulting with her attorneys on the case, not because he was
particularly sympathetic to her sex harassment complaint, but because he
opposed Clinton's claim to immunity from suit while in office.98
Starr's appointment became even more controversial three weeks later,
when it was revealed that Sentelle had met with Jesse Helms and the other
North Carolina Senator, Lauch Faircloth, who was widely known as "the
member of Congress most eager to get rid of Fiske and to nail Clinton on
Whitewater."99 The Sentelle panel went on to overlook Starr's many
92 Mokhiber, supra note 90.
9 Greg Goldin, Meet the judge who gives Ken Starr everything he wants, MONTEREY
CTY. WKLY, Apr. 16, 1998, http-//www.montereycountyweekly.com/news/localnews/meet-
the-judge-who-gives-ken-starr-everything-he-wants/article dl 56d867-8067-5185-beea-
71abb43a3146.html.
I Susan Schmidt, Judges Replace Fiske as Whitewater Counsel, WASH. POST, Aug. 6,
1994, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archivelpolitics/1 994/08/06/judges-replace-fiske-as-
whitewater-counsel/4ca08c66-62cd-4ef3-a44f-9835399ed0ee/.
9 Goldin, supra note 93.
9 Id.
9 Id.
98 Ruth Marcus, Starr: Relentless or Reluctant?, WASH. POsT.COM, Jan. 30, 1998,
http://www.washingtonpost.comL/wp-srv/politics/special/clinton/stories/counsel013098.htm.
9 Goldin, supra note 93; see also Toni Locy & Marilyn W. Thompson, Lunch Among
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apparent conflicts of interest as Starr shifted the focus of investigation to
allegations of sexual misconduct with White House intern Monica
Lewinsky. Starr submitted information to Clinton's Attorney General Reno
that Lewinsky might have submitted a false affidavit and suborned perjury in
connection with the Paula Jones case. Reno determined it would be a
conflict of interest for the DOJ to investigate Starr's claims and, as required
by the Ethics Act, petitioned the Special Division to expand the scope of
Starr's investigation.'oo Based on Clinton's deposition in the Paula Jones
case in January, 1998 and his testimony before the grand jury in Starr's
investigation, Starr submitted to the House a report accusing Clinton of
graphic sexual misconduct, perjury, obstruction of justice and abuse of
power. 101 The House passed Articles of Impeachment in December 1998.102
Clinton was ultimately acquitted by the Senate in February 1999,103 but
Starr's conduct of the investigation produced such a lurid spectacle of
excess, bias, conflicts of interest and petty partisanship, that the Starr
investigation for all practical matters destroyed the Independent Counsel as
an institutional vehicle for holding persons in high office accountable under
the law.' They delegitimized it completely. Practically speaking the
result was that the independent counsel statute was never reauthorized, and
that's why we find ourselves treated to the spectacle of Trump's repeated
threats to fire Mueller. Trump's threats are, in my view, grounded in Starr's
abuse of power. To be sure, there are those who will challenge my view by
pointing to alleged abuses of the independent counsel in the Iran-Contra




"o Marcus, supra note 98.
'0 Don Van Natta Jr., Starr Report Is Said to Claim Perjury and Abuse of Power by
President in Lewinsky Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1998,
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/politics/091198clinton-starr.html.
"o2 Alison Mitchell, Impeachment: The Overview - Clinton Impeached; He Faces a
Senate Trial, 2d in History; Vows to Do Job Till Term's 'Last Hour', N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 20,
1998, https://www.nytimes.com/1998/12/20/us/impeachment-overview-clinton-impeached-he-
faces-senate-trial-2d-history-vows-job.html.
"03 Alison Mitchell, The President's Acquittal: The Overview; Clinton Acquitted
Decisively: No Majority for Either Charge, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 13, 1999,
https://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/13/us/president-s-acquittal-overview-clinton-acquitted-
decisively-no-majority-for.html.
'(' Roberto Suro, Starr Blames His Accusers, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1999,
https://www.washingtonpost.con/wp-srv/politics/special/clinton/stories/starrO41599.htm; Dan
Morgan, U.S. Reverses Position on Counsel Law, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 1999,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/counsels/stories/counsel030299.htm.
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investigation-a sort of tit for tat retort to supposedly prove that abuse of
power is inherent in the structure of such an office, but there is, in my view,
a fundamental difference between the conducts at issue in these two
situations that rises above partisanship to warrant Walsh's investigation and
condemn Starr's. That analysis must await another day, but in my opinion,
there is no denying that Starr's abuse of power created, and may have been
intended precisely to create, the backlash that nailed the coffin shut on the
office of independent counsel, whose effects we experience today as the
conditions of Mueller's institutional vulnerability.
It shouldn't be a surprise that Kenneth Starr later testified in April of
1999 in favor of allowing the statute to expire.'0 Theodore Olson, the
defeated plaintiff in Morrison v. Olson and Starr's longtime friend had
enthusiastically endorsed Starr's appointment to the office whose
constitutionality Olson had previously spent over a million dollars
attacking." Republican Party partisans had it out for the office of
independent counsel ever since the Iran-Contra investigations and had
allowed the statute to lapse-until they saw the opportunity to use it against
Clinton. Being able to bring down both the office of the independent counsel
and the Clinton Administration (with a little help from your friends)'0o is the
kind of twofer Ollie North might think was a "neat idea".'09 And so what
Scalia lost as a matter of constitutional jurisprudence, he won as a practical
matter, for the fact that the Starr investigation was viewed as an abuse of the
power of the independent counsel by a biased prosecutor enabled by a panel
'" Roberto Suro & Guy Guliotta, Starr to Qpose Counsel Statue, WASH. POST, Apr. 14,
1999, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/special/clinton/stories/starrO41499.htm.
"n David Lauter, Fiske's Successor Is Active GOP Partisan: Special counsel: Only
recently Kenneth W. Starr weighed a bid for U.S. Senate. But friends from both parties say he
will be fair and impartial., L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1994, http://articles.latimes.com/1994-08-
06/news/mn-24148_I_special-counsel (according to Olson, "Ken is an enormously able,
extremely conscientious, very very fair individual.").
'" Laurence Silberman: The Right Man or the Right's Man?, PEOPLE FOR THE
AMERICAN WAY, Feb. 13, 2004, http://www.pfaw.org/press-releases/laurence-silberman-the-
right-man-or-the-rights-man/ (recounting Silberman's role in upholding Starr's abuse of
prosecutorial power).
'" North on the "Neat Idea" of the Diversion, UNDERSTANDING THE IRAN-CONTRA
AFFAIRS, July 8, 1987,
https://www.brown.edu/ResearchlUnderstanding the_Iran_ContraAffair/v-on7.php. During
the Iran-Contra hearings, Oliver North stated: I must confess to you that I thought using the
Ayatollah's money to support the Nicaraguan Resistance was a right idea.. .I don't think it was
wrong. I think it was a neat idea...." Both Silbermann, who ruled against the constitutionality
of the Independent Counsel in the lower court proceedings in Morrison and for a broad
interpretation of the scope of Starr's authority in the Clinton investigation, and Sentelle, who
appointed Starr, at different points took actions adverse to the Independent Counsel's
investigation and prosecution of persons responsible for the Iran-Contra scandal. See
Silberman, supra note 108.
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of partisan judges only served to vindicate Scalia's dissent in Morrison. 0
Scalia it was said, had warned us, and now that the warning had come true,
maybe he was right about the constitutional imperative of keeping
prosecutorial power accountable to a unitary executive.
B. Second Path: The Unitary Executive and the Torture Memos
The second path forward from Morrison to yesterday's news happened
in the world of legal theory. Scalia's opposition to the independent counsel
was based on his view that Constitution vests all executive power in the
President. The Ethics in Government Act violated Scalia's understanding of
"the unitary executive" by vesting a portion of executive power, specifically
to prosecute high level officials in the executive branch, in a prosecutor
whose appointment and removal was ultimately up to a federal court. Now
this theory of "the unitary executive" is a very interesting animal. I suspect
most people familiar with references to this "unitary executive" today in
2018 imagine it to be a well-established doctrine of constitutional law
grounded in the original intent of the framers. If you do, you may be
surprised to learn that the first time reference to the concept or doctrine of a
"unitary executive" appears in the Supreme Court is in Scalia's dissent in
Morrison v. Olson. Search, as I have, for references to the unitary executive
in the Supreme Court reports, and up until around the time the torture
scandal erupted in 2004, you will find only four appearances. More
significantly, you will find that in all four instances, the unitary executive is
never in a majority opinion. After its first appearance in Scalia's Morrison
dissent in 1988, the unitary executive doesn't make its next appearance until
Justice Breyer's 1997 concurrence in Clinton v. Jones, where it is invoked to
qualify the Supreme Court's decision that a sitting president is not immune
from federal civil litigation for acts prior and unrelated to the presidency."'
It appears the following year in Clinton v. City of New York, where Breyer
again invokes it in objecting to the constitutionality of the Line Item Veto
Act,'t2 and then not until 2004, when it hijacks Justice Thomas' dissent in
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, to advance a vision of executive power rejected by the
n0 Terry Bastland, Scalia's Finest Opinion, THE WKLY. STANDARD, Mar. 11, 2016,
https://www.weeklystandard.com/terry-eastland/scalias-finest-opinion; John J. LaFalce,
Justice Scalia's Strong Words on the Independent Counsel Act, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Feb. 9, 1998, https://www.csmonitor.com/1998/0209/020998.opin.opin.2.html;
Paul T. Cappuccio, Scalia Was Right About The Independent Counsel Law, WALL ST. J., June
29, 1998, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB899062794444552500; Paul Greenbery, Justice
Scalia's Greatest Dissent, JEWISH WORLD REv., Apr. 8, 2016,
http://www.jewishworldreview.com/cols/greenberg040816.php3.
". Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 713 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring).
112 Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417,489-90 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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majority, but chilling in its scope insofar as it would grant the president the
unilateral power to detain individuals indefinitely, based on "virtually
conclusive factual findings" "free of any 'judicial second guessing' that the
person is an "enemy combatant.""3
Now the really fascinating question is this. How is it that a doctrine that
has received so little traction in the Supreme Court, languishing mostly in
dissents, and never in the controlling majority since Scalia made its stillborn
introduction, has nevertheless enjoyed such a decidedly robust life in the
executive branch and, more specifically, in the Office of Legal Counsel?
This is so much so that the unitary executive has been called the doctrine
behind the presidency of George W. Bush because his Administration used it
ubiquitously as rounds to expand profoundly the asserted scope of
executive power. While all its uses and abuses have a story to tell, I want
to focus on its appearance in one of the OLC memos that mapped the legal
theory for the authorization of "enhanced interrogation techniques." This is
the so-called "Bybee Memo" regarding Standards of Conduct for
Interrogation under 18 US.C. § 2340-2340A"' which reportedly was
relied on by CIA personnel interrogating "High-Value Detainees,"'16 until it
was withdrawn in June 2004, replaced in December 2004 by a
superseding OLC memorandum,"8 and again disavowed in 2009.119
"3 Hamdiv. Rumsfield, 542 U.S. 507, 581-82 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
"4 Dahlia Lithwick, Look for the Sign, SLATE, June 19, 2007,
http://www.slate.com/articles/newsand_politics/recycled/2007/06/look f r the sign.htm;
Jennifer Van Bergen, The Unitary Executive: Is The Doctrine Behind the Bush Presidency
Consistent with a Democratic State?, FINDLAw, Jan. 09, 2006,
https://supreme.findlaw.com/legal-commentary/the-unitary-executive-is-the-doctrine-behind-
the-bush-presidency-consistent-with-a-democratic-state.htmi.
"s See Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales Counsel to the President re: Standards of
Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, Op. O.L.C. (Office of Legal
Counsel, August 2002) [hereinafter Op. O.L.C.] (referencing Report: Investigation into the
Office of Legal Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence
Agency's Use of "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques" on Suspected Terrorists, ACLU-RDI
5022 (Dept of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, July 2009) which refers to the
cited memorandum as the "Bybee Memo" on pg. 7).
116 See e.g. CENT. INTEL. AGENCY, BACKGROUND PAPER ON CIA's COMBINED USE OF
INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES (2004) (supplementing Report: Investigation into the Office of
Legal Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency's
Use of "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques" on Suspected Terrorists, ACLU-RDI 5022 (Dept
of Jusice, Office of Professional Responsibility, July 2009) which references the Bybee Memo
being used in some form by the CIA on pg. 133).
"' See Daniel Klaidman, Palace Revolt, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 5, 2006,
https://www.newsweek.com/palace-revolt- 11340.
"' See Memorandum for James B. Comey Deputy Attorney General Re: Standards of
Confuct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, Op. O.L.C., 1-2 (Office of Legal
Counsel, August 2004).
" See Memorandum for the Files Re: Status of Certain OLC Opinions Issued in the
Aftermath of the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, Op. O.L.C. (Office of Legal
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18 U.S.C §§ 2340-2340A, known as the "Extraterritorial Torture
Statute," is the federal statute that criminalizes torture committed outside the
United States by any public official, e.g. CIA personnel, under color of law
against persons within that official's custody or control.12 0 The statute was
enacted in 1994 to implement U.S. obligations under the Convention against
Torture, which requires state parties to prosecute persons for torture under
the principle of universal jurisdiction.121 After the CIA began detaining and
interrogating suspected "unlawful enemy combatants" in Afghanistan and at
Guantanamo, it reportedly requested authorization to use techniques
proposed by CIA psychologists involved in the U.S. Military's SERE
training program, but expressed concerns that using these techniques would
expose CIA interrogators to criminal liability for torture.122 According to the
report of the Office of Professional Responsibility, John Yoo added the
section of the Bybee Memo purporting to deny Congress any role in
criminalizing torture committed in the course of interrogating enemy
combatants pursuant to the President's Commander-in-Chief powers after
Michael Chertoff, then head of the DOJ's Criminal Division, told him to
inform the CIA that the Criminal Division would not issue advance pardons
for CIA interrogations that violated the Torture Statute.12 3
The section on the President's Commander-in-Chief Power appears as
Part V and opens with the remarkable claim that "[e]ven if an interrogation
method arguably were to violate Section 2340A, the statute would be
unconstitutional if it impermissibly encroached on the President's
constitutional power to conduct a military campaign." 24 The memo asserts
that pursuant to the doctrine of "constitutional avoidance," the OLC will not
read into the statute Congressional intent that the statute's criminal
prohibitions apply to interrogations conducted pursuant to the President's
Commander-in-Chief authority.12 5 Later, the Bybee Memo goes further and
asserts that "the Department of Justice could not enforce Section 2340A
against federal officials acting pursuant to the President's constitutional
Counsel, August 2009) (referencing the Bybee Memo on pg. 4 and stating that it is disavowed
on pg. 11).
120 See Elise Keppler, et al., First Prosecution in the United States for Torture Committed
Abroad: The Trial of Charles 'Chuckie' Taylor, Jr., 6 WASH. COLL. LAW HUM. RIGHTS BRIEF
18, 18 (2008) (describing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A as "extraterritorial Torture Statute").
121 Id. at 18-9.
122 See Avidan Y. Cover, Supervisory Responsibility for the Office of Legal Counsel, 25
GEO. J. LEG. ETHICs 269, 278 (2012) (discussing SERE training as well as the concern of
legality of the techniques).
1" See Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues
Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency's Use of "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques" on
Suspected Terrorists, ACLU-RDI 5022, 49-50 (Dept. of Justice, Office of Professional
Responsibility, July 2009).
124 See Op. O.L.C., supra note 115, at3l.
'2' Id. at 34-5.
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authority to wage a military campaign" even if they found that Congress
expressly intended for the prohibition on torture to apply to such
interrogations.126 Much has already been said and done to repudiate this
interpretation of the president's Commander-in-Chief powers, but for us the
important point is to ask where this interpretation came from.
In the world of human affairs, if we want to learn who is implicated in
or responsible for a crime, we have to "follow the money." In the world of
legal theory, we have to follow the citations. Who does Yoo cite for his
argument from "constitutional avoidance" and his claim that the DOJ cannot
enforce a federal criminal statute against a federal executive officer acting
under presidential authority in violation of that statute? Interestingly enough,
in both instances, it's the same 1984 OLC opinion entitled Prosecution for
Contempt of Congress of an Executive Branch Official Who Has Asserted A
Claim of Executive Privilege.12 7 The 1984 memo asserted that executive
branch officials cannot be subject to prosecution for criminal contempt of
Congress for asserting executive privilege because such prosecutions would
"significantly and immeasurably impair the President's ability to fulfill his
constitutional duties." Yoo cites this 1984 memo for the proposition that the
"constitutional principles" invoked in the 1984 memo, "preclude an
application of Section 2340A to punish officials for aiding the President in
exercising his exclusive constitutional authorities. Id."i 28
But what is this Id? The 1984 memo has nothing at all to do with the
President's Commander-in-Chief powers and can hardly be an Id. for the
claim that C.I.A. interrogators can't be prosecuted for torture. On the
contrary, if you follow Yoo's cite, you see that this 1984 memo is none other
than the OLC opinion that triggered the confrontation between Congress and
the E.P.A. over the E.P.A's refusal to comply with a congressional subpoena
that ultimately resulted in Theodore Olson's testimony regarding his rble in,.
this confrontation being referred to the Independent Counsel. The 1984
opinion Yoo cites did not deal with the president's Commander-in-Chief
powers, but it did proffer an expansive view of the DOJ's plenary and
preclusive control over the exercise of federal prosecutorial power. Not only
did the 1984 memo assert that "[t]he President, through a United States
Attorney, need not, indeed may not, prosecute criminally a subordinate for
asserting on his behalf a claim of executive privilege[,]"' it further asserted
that neither the Legislative Branch nor the courts could "require or
126 See Op. O.L.C., supra note 115, at 36 (italics added).
127 See Memorandum Opinion for the Attorney General Re: Prosecution for Contempt of
Congress of an Executive Branch Official Who Has Asserted a Claim of Executive Privilege,
Op. O.L.C., 134 (Office of Legal Counsel, August 2002) [hereinafter Memorandum Opinion
for the Attorney General].
128 See Op. O.L.C., supra note 115, at 35.
129 See Memorandum Opinion for the Attorney General, supra note 127, at 141.
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implement the prosecution of such an individual."1 30 Yoo concedes that the
1984 memo treats of "a different context," but that does not stop him from
summing up his argument for CIA immunity from prosecution for torture in
words that echo and extend the theory, not of the Commander-in-chief
power, but of "the unitary executive." Yoo puts it this way, "[a]lthough
Congress may define federal crimes that the President, through the Take
Care Clause, should prosecute, Congress cannot compel the President to
prosecute outcomes taken pursuant to the President's own constitutional
authority. If Congress could do so, it could control the President's authority
through the manipulation of federal criminal law."' 3' Interestingly enough,
then, the legal theory used to cast CIA immunity from prosecution for
torture as a constitutional necessity is nothing but an extension of the theory
of the unitary executive articulated in a 1984 memo written by Theodore
Olson in order to frustrate a Congressional investigation of alleged
shenanigans at Reagan's E.P.A. So then what happens?
IV. WHEN IMPUNITY AND CORRUPTION CONVERGE: HOW THE PAST
BECOMES THE FUTURE AGAIN
Well then in November 2008, Obama wins the presidential election, and
on his first full day in office, he bans coercive interrogations and orders the
closure of remaining CIA black sites, but from the beginning of his first term
to the end of his second, President Obama made it very clear that he was
more interested in looking "forward as opposed to backwards." 3 2 Not
surprisingly, his Attorney General, Eric Holder, shared the President's
conviction. Thus, rather than appointing a special prosecutor to investigate
CIA treatment of detainees in their custody as the ACLU requested as early
as March 2009,' on August 24, 2009, A.G. Holder assigned the job to John
Durham, who was then in the process of investigating whether any laws
were violated by the destruction of CIA interrogation tapes in 2005. 134 In
expanding the mandate Durham had received from Bush's A.G. Mukasey,
Holder echoed Obama's concern that the country look forward rather than
130 Id
131 See Op. O.L.C., supra note 115, at 36.
132 See Scott Shane, Holder Rules Out Prosecutions in C.I.A. Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 30, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/31/us/holder-rules-out-prosecutions-in-cia-
interrogations.html.
'1 See Letter from American Civil Liberties Union, to Eric Holder, Att'y Gen., Dep't of
Justice (March 17, 2009), https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-asks-justice-department-appoint-
independent-prosecutor-investigate-torture.
134 Top prosecutor orders probe into interrogations; Obama shifts onus, CNN, Aug. 24,
2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/08/24/us.terror.interrogations/index.html; Kevin
Whitelaw, CIA Under Scrutiny as Prosecutor Leads Abuse Inquiry, NPR, Aug. 24, 2009,
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=1 12166549.
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backward and assured his intended audiences that "[t]he Department of
Justice will not prosecute anyone who acted in good faith and within the
scope of the legal guidance given by the Office of Legal Counsel regarding
the interrogation of detainees."135
To make a long story short, the results of Durham's investigations were
disappointing from the perspective of the struggle against impunity. In
2010, Durham announced he would not bring charges against anyone
involved in destroying the CIA tapes,136 and in 2012, Holder announced that
no one would be prosecuted in connection with the deaths of two CIA
detainees for lack of "admissible evidence sufficient to obtain and sustain a
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt."' In fact, all during Obama's
presidency, as new evidence clarified the scope of the abuses and the
identities of principals and architects of the torture program, human rights
groups called on the Administration to investigate and prosecute to no avail.
For example, when George W. Bush openly admitted to his role in
personally approving the waterboarding of three detainees, calls that the
matter be referred to Durham for investigation led nowhere.38
After the Senate Intelligence Committee released its study of the CIA's
Detention and Interrogation Program on December 9, 2014,13 human rights
groups again appealed to the administration for the appointment of a special
prosecutor for torture. Indeed, Human Rights Watch cited information
released in the Senate report in its requests to A.G. Holder in December
2014,14 in a similar request to A.G. Loretta Lynn, on June 8, 2015,141 and to
13' Attorney General Eric Holder Regarding a Preliminary Review into the Interrogation
of Certain Detainees, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Aug. 24, 2009,
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-regarding-preliminary-
review-interrogation-certain-detainees.
" Terry Frieden, No prosecution for destruction of CIA tapes, Justice Department says,
CNN, Nov. 9, 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/11/09/cia.interrogation.tapes/index.html.
' Shane, supra note 132.
us Dan Froomkin, Bush's Waterboarding Admission Prompts Calls for Criminal Probe,
HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 11, 2010, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/11/calls-for-
criminal-invest_n_782354.html; Bush Openly Confesses Torture Authorization, No
Prosecutions for CIA Tape Destruction: Why We Care and Why Bush Should Worry I Center
for Constitutional Rights, CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS,
https://ccrjustice.org/home/get-involved/tools-resources/inside-ccr/bush-openly-confesses-
torture-authorization-no (last visited Sept. 4, 2018).
" Mark Mazzetti, Panel Faults C.I.A. Over Brutality and Deceit in Terrorism
Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/1 0/world/senate-intelligence-committee-cia-torture-
report.html.
"o Letter from Anthony Romero, Exec. Dir., American Civil Liberties Union & Kenneth
Roth, Exec. Dir., Human Rights Watch to Eric Holder, Att'y General, Dec. 22, 2014,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/1222/letter-attorney-general-holder-requesting-appointment-
special-prosecutor-torture (last visited Sep 3, 2018).
141 Letter from Kenneth Roth, Exec. Dir., Human Rights Watch to Loretta Lynch, Att'y
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President Obama, himself, on June 16, 2016.142 In all of these requests,
HRW noted limitations in Durham's investigation, the availability of new
evidence, and the country's obligations to investigate and prosecute torture
under international law. On each occasion, requests for appointment of a
special prosecutor noted the danger that the mantra of forward, not
backwards would provide aid and comfort to impunity. As HRW put it:
[T]he necessity of investigating issues of criminal liability
is made more urgent by the fact that many of the
individuals who authorized the conduct documented in the
Senate torture report are publicly defending the necessity,
effectiveness, and legality of that conduct. Against this
background, we believe the failure to conduct a
comprehensive criminal investigation would contribute to
the notion that torture remains a permissible policy option
for future administrations; undermine the ability of the
United States to advocate for human rights abroad; and
compromise Americans' faith in the rule of law at home. 143
Trump's election in 2016 on a campaign promising to bring back
torture and his subsequent nomination of Gina Haspel to direct the CIA 1 "
perhaps enables us now to come full circle to the problem of structural
corruption. When the corruption of a system is so layered by the history of
things done and undone that the otherwise quite understandable desire to
look forward rather than backward becomes the vehicle of impunity, this is
when the past is future again. The Obama Administration refused to
prosecute the atrocity crimes of the Bush regime because Obama wanted to
look forward rather than backward, and so his Attorney General announced
a general immunity for torture conducted within the parameters set forth by
the OLC memos. 14 5 But what if the Office of the Independent Counsel had
never been so relentlessly attacked by ideological partisans of the unitary
executive? We most likely will never know whether Gina Haspel would
have been prosecuted, rather than promoted, and only time will tell whether
Mueller's investigation will come to a premature or defective termination
that could have been avoided had the protections of the Independent Counsel
statute been available. What we do know is that the history of impunity in
Guatemala gives us good reason to believe that prosecuting the atrocity
General, June 8, 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/08/letter-attorney-general-loretta-
lynch-outlining-human-rights-priorities-department (last visited Sep 3, 2018).
142 Letter from Kenneth Roth, Exec. Dir., Human Rights Watch to Barack Obama,
President, June 16, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/06/16/letter-president-obama-re-cia-
torture (last visited Sep 3, 2018).
143 Letter from Kenneth Roth to Loretta Lynch, supra note 141.
144 Savage, supra note 24; see generally Trump's Draft Executive Order, supra note 24.
145 Attorney General Eric Holder Regarding a Preliminary Review into the Interrogation
of Certain Detainees, supra note 134.
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crimes of those in high places is indeed an absolutely overriding value,
notwithstanding Scalia's asserted view to the contrary in Morrison v.
Olson.'
Scalia's dissent in Morrison is worth taking issue with, not only
because it mischaracterizes original intent, normalizes unethical behavior by
prosecutors and judges, and attacks the principle of government under the
rule of law, but because of the sophistical manner in which it dissimulates
these moves in the guise of securing accountability to the people as the only
satisfactory and constitutionally authentic remedy for corruption in high
places. And here perhaps we can tie up the final loose ends of my
presentation. I have now shown you how Haspel's confirmation and
Mueller's travails are connected to each other by way of an absence, a
lack-the vacuum created by the demise of the office of independent
counsel, engineered by partisans of the unitary executive. The final question
is what any of this has to do with Guatemala or with the genocide conviction
and reversal of Rios Montt.
Montt's conviction was reversed by the Guatemalan Constitutional
Court under heavy pressure from business and military elites' 47 on the
ostensible grounds that the lower court had improperly dismissed Rios
Montt's amnesty request under the defunct Decree Law 8-86.148 Certainly.
the legitimacy of the amnesty granted to CIA personnel continues to be a
matter of concern insofar it features centrally in the continued interest the
case raises internationally, most notably with the prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court.14 9 But I think Guatemala's experience has
other lessons to offer regarding the consequences of allowing impunity in
high office to take hold of a government.
In one respect, the bigger lesson is in the story of Guatemalan president,
Otto P6rez Molina, who was forced to resign the presidency on October 3,
2015 after Guatemalan prosecutors supported by the United Nations
International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala [CICIG] 50
revealed his role in a corruption scheme of bribes and kickbacks involving
the diversion of millions of dollars from the people to officials at all levels
14 See generally Morrison, 487 U.S., at 371.
14' Burt, supra note 13.
"' Valey, supra note 10 (providing remarkable account of the reasoning with which a
majority of the Constitutional Court overturned the lower court's dismissal of Rios Montt's
amnesty request and the successive judicial recusals that followed the Court's reversal).
'4 Merrit Kennedy, ICC Prosecutor Calls for Afghanistan War Crimes Investigation,
NPR, Nov. 3, 2017, https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/11/03/561842662/icc-
prosecutor-calls-for-afghanistan-war-crimes-investigation; see ICC-02/17, Request for
Authorization of an Investigation Pursuant to Article 15, Nov. 20, 2017, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/courtrecords/cr2017 06891 .pdf.
's See generally CoMisiON INTERNACIONAL CONTRA LA IMPUNIDAD EN GUATEMALA
(CICIG), https://www.cicig.org/ (last visited Sep 3, 2018).
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of government including the president and vice president.'5' Francisco
Goldman does an excellent job showing how a culture of impunity can so
seize the institutions of a country that it takes five months of mass protests
by hundreds of thousands of people to force the members of these
institutions one by one to abandon their role in giving cover to a corrupt and
criminal presidency.152 Perhaps the mass uprising by which the Guatemalan
people secured the resignation of Pdrez Molina in some way vindicates
Justice Scalia's vision of a legal system that recurs to the people to secure
itself from the corruption of a legally unaccountable unitary executive, but
more likely it does not.
's' Francisco Goldman, From President to Prison: Otto Perez Molina and a Day for Hope
in Guatemala, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 4, 2015, https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-
desk/from-president-to-prison-otto-perez-molina-and-a-day-for-hope-in-guatemala.
152 Id.
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